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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of 
the Estate of J. Parry Bowen, et. al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CULBERT L. OLSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
* * * * * 
CULBERT L. OLSON, 
Cross-Complainant and Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of 
the Estate of J. Parry Bowen, et al., 
Cross-Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Case No. 
8060 
Come now the appellants in the above entitled matter, 
and respectfully petition this Honorable Court to grant a 
rehearing in the above entitled cause. 
The specific reasons for requesting a rehearing in this 
matter are the following: 
1 
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I. 
The Court errs in failing to hold that appellants were 
entitled to a decree quieting their respective titles in view of 
the holding in its opinion, that the appellants had adverse 
possession for more than seven years, that during said 
period two years taxes were not assessed, and that five years 
taxes were paid promptly, making a total of seven years, and 
that appellants failed to obtain such decree for allowing the 
eighth and ninth years' taxes to become delinquent and go 
to preliminary tax sale. 
II. 
The Court errs in holding that the redemption of the 
preliminary tax sale for the year 194 7, on December 29th, 
1949, was not the payment of taxes, under Utah's adverse 
possession statute, for the following reasons: 
A. 
In the seven states listed as holding the "majority rule", 
there are seventeen cases cited. Eleven of these seventeen 
cases, the states of Arkansas, Illinois, Washington and 
South Dakota, are deciding upon limitation statutes which 
involve the payment of taxes on "vacant and unoccupied 
lands", and no possession is required in such cases. In the 
Colorado case, the prior record owner paid one of the seven 
years' taxes, breaking the continuity of the adverse poss-
ession and the case is not in point. In the two Texas cases, 
the ruling is that in adverse possession cases, taxes must 
be paid each year before delinquency, and Texas is the only 
2 
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state holding such a rule. In the two New Mexico cases, it 
is held that redemption from a final tax sale comparable 
to our May sale, or auditor's sale, is not the payment of 
taxes. There are, therefore, only two of seventeen cases 
which hold that in adverse possession cases, taxes must be 
paid each year before delinquency, which is virtually what 
this Supreme Court holds in its opinion. 
B. 
All states except Texas hold in cases involving adverse 
possession and the payment of taxes, that any payment 
made to relieve the land from the tax lien prior to the final 
sale where title passes (similar to our May sale or auditor's 
sale and not our preliminary sale) , is ·a payment of taxes 
under the adverse possession statutes. 
c. 
The taxing statutes of all of the states mentioned in the 
opinion of this Supreme Court, except California, have but 
one tax sale which is a final sale comparable to our May Sale 
or Auditor's Sale, and that except for California, there are 
no states which have a tax sale comparable to our Prelimin-
ary Sale. 
D. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held many times that no 
title passes at our preliminary sale, that the tax lien is not 
extinguished by such sale, and the redemption is made by 
paying the taxes to extinguish the tax lien. 
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m. 
The court erred in holding that the mineral estate was 
subject to the general rule it made that redemption was not 
the payment of taxes, for the reason that no taxes were 
assessed against the mineral estate for the years 1947, 1948 
and 1949, and such mineral estate was never sold for taxes. 
IV. 
The court erred in failing to decide the points raised 




The headings for the various errors will not be repeated 
here. Reference is made to the headings listed in the peti-
tion for rehearing proper. 
In its opinion in Bowen v. Olson, 268 P.2d 983, at page 
984, this Supreme Court says: 
"The facts with respect to the payment of taxes 
are as follows: No taxes were assessed against 
the lands in 1940 or 1941. Each year thereafter 
to and including 1946, all taxes were promptly 
paid. The taxes for the next two years, 194 7-8, 
are the ones of critical moment here; they were 
not paid and the property was sold for taxes to 
Uintah County. On December 30, 1949, after 
this suit was commenced, the amount of delin-
quent taxes, interest, penalties and costs were paid 
4 
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by "J. Parry Bowen by Morley Dean" and a re-
demption certificate was issued." 
Adding the two years in which no taxes were assessed, 
namely 1940 and 1941, to the five years in which taxes 
were promptly paid, a total of seven years is obtained. This 
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that when no taxes 
are assessed, such years may be included within the seven 
years required for adverse possession. Seven years adverse 
possession and the payment of taxes for seven years are 
all that can be required by the decisions in this state. 
Appellants in their original brief at page 24 made this 
observation: 
"The record shows that no taxes were assessed for 
the years 1940 and 1941, and that they were 
promptly paid by the plaintiffs and their prede-
cessors in title for the years 1942, 1943, 1944, 
1945 and 1946, or a total of seven years success-
ively." 
This Supreme Court, holding with appellants' conten-
tion that seven years' taxes were paid, should have granted 
a reversal and made an order that the title be quieted in 
plaintiffs. 
The Utah cases deciding this point are as follows: 
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 
Utah, 528, 101 Pac. 586. 
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler et. al., 45 Utah, 85, 142 
Pac. 1119, which states: 
5 
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To make good title by adverse possession, the de-
fendants were required to pay all taxes lawfully 
levied and assessed against the premises so claim-
ed by them. If, however, no taxes were lawfully 
assessed or levied against the premises so claimed 
and occupied by them, they could acquire title by 
adverse possession without payment of taxes. That 
seems to be the holding of the California and other 
courts under statutes similar to ours." (Quoting 
California and Idaho.) 
Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah, 107, 168 Pac. 
554. 
Hanks v. Lee, 57 Utah, 537, 195 Pac. 302. 
Other cases from other states are as follows: 
United States v. Wooten et. al., 40 F(2d), 882, constru-
ing New Mexico tax statutes. 
Lara v. Sandell, et. ux., 52 Wash. 58, 100 Pac. 166. 
The latest holding in this state is the case of Christen-
sen v. Munster, et. al., 266 P.2d, 756. In that decision this 
court said: 
"Among other things, our statute, requires pay-
ment of all the taxes for 7 consecutive years in 
order to acquire title by adverse possession, and 
we have said many times that such payment is 
necessary before the inchoate interest of an ad-
verse possessor might ripen into a fee." 
The 7 consecutive years in the opinion of Utah Copper 
Co. v. Chandler et. al., supra, includes years in which no 
taxes are assessed. 
6 
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From the rulings in Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 173, 
166 P.2d 239, the period of adversity began on September 
30th, 1940. 
"Issuance of an auditor's tax deed did not give 
the county possession. It was the act of placing 
tenants in actual possession which initiated possess-
ion by the county. The fact that the auditor's deed 
was invalid and the further fact that because of 
the invalidity of the May sale a further period 
of redemption was vouchsafed to the record owner 
does not change the character and nature of the 
possession asserted through tenants from being 
one under a claim of ownership. At the time 
when the county took possession of the property 
it did so claiming that it had a valid title, there 
having been an attempt to comply with all the 
provisions relating to tax sales. The fact that 
there were defects in the proceedings did not 
change the nature of the county's claim. It was 
open, hostile and adverse to the record owner's 
right." 
As shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 34-36, Burns 
Hallett bought the property in question from Uintah County 
under an Agreement for Sale of Real Property which re-
cited: 
"It is mutually covenanted and agreed between 
the parties hereto that the said vendee shall be let 
and have immediate possession of~ said premises." 
This contract, under the ruling of Bozievich v. Slechta, 
supra, was an assertion by the county of its rights under 
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In the case of Adams v. Lamicq, (Utah), 221 P.2d 1037, 
this Supreme Court held: 
"No taxes were levied against the eighty acre 
tract from 1936 to 1940, but in 1941, 1942, and 
1943, the respondents paid taxes on that property 
in proportion to their equitable interest in the tract 
under their purchase contract." 
Under such circumstances, this Supreme Court held 
that this was sufficient payment of taxes under the adverse 
possession statute. How much more should the payment 
of taxes be in the case before the court? 
"The County initiated possession in November of 
1937 by placing its lessee, Brady, upon the lands. 
At the expiration of Brady's term, the respondents 
entered upon the lands under a one year lease with 
the County, and after obtaining a contract to 
purchase and later a quitclaim deed, they remained 
there until the commencement of this action. In 
Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239, 
this court held that the act of a county in placing 
tenants upon property to which the county claimed 
title thereto under a Auditor's Tax Deed constitut-
ed a possession adverse to the record title owner 
even though it was later revealed that the auditor's 
tax deed was void because of defects in the tax 
sale procedure." 
Appellants most strongly urge that the rulings of this 
court that the plaintiffs had seven years adverse possession 
commencing September 30th, 1940, that no taxes were 
assessed for 1940 and 1941, and that plaintiffs paid the taxes 
for the years 1942 to1946 inclusive before they became 
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due, already hold that plaintiffs have complied with the 
adverse possession statutes and are now vested in fee simple 
with the title. 
ERROR II. 
SUBDIVISION A. 
The case of Bowen vs. Olson, (Utah) 268 Pac. 2d, 983, 
·in foot note 1 at the bottom of page 984, makes this state-
ment: 
"The cases cited by the plaintiffs in support of 
their contention do not involve any question of 
adverse possession.'' 
An examination of the cases cited in footnotes from 2 
to 9 inclusive, and 12, disclose that the cases revolved upon 
the following statutes of limitation: 
ARKANSAS: -
(1) Wyse v. Johnson, 83 Ark. 520, 104 S.W. 204. 
The case turns on the limitation statute in the Digest of 
the Statutes of Arkansas, Kirby & Castle, 1916, page 1428, 
as follows: 
"SECTION 5985. Unimproved and uninclosed 
land shall be deemed and held to be in possession 
of the person who pays the taxes thereon if he have 
color of title thereto, but no person shall be en-
titled to invoke the benefit of this act unless he and 
those under whom he claims shall have paid such 
taxes for at least seven years in succession, and 
not less than three of such payments must be 
made subsequent to the passage of this act (5). 
Act March 18, 1899." 
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(2) Walsh v. Certain Lands, 209 Ark. 320, 190 S.W. 2d, 
447. 
The case turns on the limitation statute in Pope's Di-
gest, 1937, in Section No. 13856, as follows: 
"SECTION 13856. Unimproved and uninclosed 
land shall be deemed and held to be in possession 
of the person who pays the taxes thereon if he 
have color of title thereto, but no person shall be 
entitled to invoke the benefit of this act unless he 
and those under whom he claims shall have paid 
such taxes for at least seven years in succession, 
and not less than three of such payments must be 
made subsequent to the passage of this act. Act 
March 18, 1899." 
ILLINOIS: 
(1) Holbrook v. Dickinson, 56 Ill. 497: Action in 
ejectment. 
The case turns on the act of March 2, 1839, which is 
still in effect today. It reads as follows as quoted from 
Cahill Illinois Revised Statues, 1927, pages 2110, et. seq, 
and the limitation is known as Section 7: 
"Whenever a person having color of title, made in 
good faith, to vacant and unoccupied land, shall 
pay all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven 
successive years, he or she shall be deemed and 
adjudged to be the legal owner of said vacant and 
unoccupied land, to the extent and according to the 
purport of his or her paper title. All persons hold-
ing under such tax-payer, by purchase, devise or 
descent, before said seven years shall have expired, 
and who shall continue to pay the taxes, as afore-
10 
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said, so as to complete the payment of taxes for 
the term aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit 
of this section: Provided, however, if any person, 
having a better paper title to said vacant and un-
occupied land, shall, during the said term of seven 
years, pay the taxes assessed on said land for any 
one or more years of the said term of seven years, 
then and in that case such tax-payer, his heirs and 
assigns, shall not be entitled to the benefit of this 
section." 
(2) Hart v. Randolph, 142 Ill. 521, 32 N.E. 517: Ac-
tion for setting forth dower. 
Quotes from Irving v. Brownell, 11 Ill. 402, Woodruff 
v. McHarry, 56 Ill. 218, and Holbrook v. Dickenson, 56 Ill. 
497. It recites: 
"A purchase of land at the tax sale is not a pay-
ment of the tax within the meaning of the statute, 
(Irving v. Brownell, 11 Ill. 402, Woodruff v. Me-
Harry, 56 Ill. 218), nor is redemption from the 
tax sale such a payment. (Holbrook v. Dickenson, 
56 Ill. 497.) " 
The statute referred to is Section 7 above quoted. 
(3) Robertson v. Bachman, 352 Ill. 291, 185 N.E. 618: 
Recites as follows: 
"That redemption from a forfeiture is not a pay-
ment of taxes within the meaning of section 7 of 
the Limitations act is in accord with the construc-
tion placed upon an identical section of the laws 
of Washington by the Supreme Court of that State. 
Seymour v. Dufur, 53 Wash. 756, 102, Pac. 756; 
Kennedy v. Anderson, 88 Wash. 457, 153 Pac. 319." 
11 
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This construes the case as one revolving on the above 
quoted Section 7 which does not involve adverse possession. 
(4) Irving vs. Brownell, 11 Ill. 403: Action in eject-
ment. 
This case actually involved adverse possession and the 
payment of taxes. However it is shown that the defendant 
(the adverse possessor) took possession in 1841. 
"The purchase by defendant of land for taxes of 
1844, was no payment by him, but a purchase. 
The taxes were paid by plaintiff when he redeemed 
from that sale." (Emphasis ours.) 
The same ruling was handed down in this case as was 
handed down by this Supreme Court in Aggelos v. Zelia Min. 
Co., 99 Utah 417, 107 P.2d 170, 132 A.L.R. 213. There is 
no question about redemption being the payment of taxes 
allowed by the adverser to go delinquent. 
(5) Woodruff v. McHarry, 56 Ill. 218; Action in eject-
ment. 
Turns on the Limitation Statute, Section 7, as above 
quoted, and makes the following remarks: 
"The defendant also sets up color of title and pay-
ment of taxes for seven years. But the land was 
sold one year during the seven, and although bid 
in for the benefit of the defendant, the bid being 
paid with his money, yet this was not a payment 
of taxes, within the statute, as has been repeatedly 
decided by this court." 
No adverse possession was involved in this action. The 
12 
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distinction between this class of cases in Illinois, and those 
involving adverse possession and the payment of taxes are 
set forth under another heading, and the attention of the 
court is urgently invited to the perusal of the cases involv-
ing adverse possession. 
WASHINGTON: 
(1) Tremmel et al. v. Mess et al., 46 Wash. 137, 89 P. 
487: Action to quiet title. 
Statute construed: Section 5504, 2 Ballinger's Ann. 
Codes & St., as follows: 
"Every person having color of title made in good 
faith to vacant and unoccupied lands, who shall pay 
all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven suc-
cessive years, he or she shall be deemed and ad-
judged the legal owner of said vacant and unoccu-
pied land to the extent and according to the purport 
of his or her paper title. All persons holding under 
such taxpayer, by purchase, devise, or descent, be-
fore said seven years shall have expired, and who 
shall continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid, so as 
to complete the payment of taxes for the term 
aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit of this 
section: Provided, however, if any person have a 
better paper title to said vacant and unoccupied 
land shall, during the said term of seven years, 
pay the taxes as assessed on said land for any one 
or more years of said term of seven years, then 
and in that case such taxpayer, his heirs or assigns, 
shall not be entitled to the benefit of this section." 
In this case, the tax deed was void for irregularity, as 
has been held in the case before the court. The court says: 
13 
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"It will be seen that the appellants and their pre-
decessor, Mr. Lambert, have paid seven years' 
taxes; but the first payment of taxes, if a redemp-
tion of a tax certificate may be said to be a pay-
ment of taxes within the statute above quoted, was 
made in 1902. This action was brought in 1906, 
so that only four years elapsed after the first pay-
ment of the taxes. The Supreme Court of Illinois 
has construed a statute identical with ours to mean 
that, in order to constitute a bar, seven years must 
elapse between the date of the first payment and 
the commencement of the suit. Burton v. Perry, 
146 Ill. 71, 126, 34 N. E. 60, and cases there cited. 
We think that construction is undoubtedly cor-
rect." 
It is to be noted here, that the decision is the same as 
the case of Aggelos v. Zelia Min. Co., supra, which holds 
that payment of taxes already delinquent at the time of the 
tax title purchase, cannot be considered the payment of 
taxes under our adverse possession statute. 
(2) Seymour v. Dufur, 53, Wash. 646, 102 P. 756: Ac-
tion in Ejectment. 
This case turns on Section 5504, Ballinger's Ann. Codes 
& St. (Pierce's Code, No. 1161), as hereinabove quoted. The 
court says: 
"It is conceded in this case that these taxes were 
not paid by the respondent every successive year 
during the seven years. But it was shown that 
they had been paid before the commencement of 
the action by the introduction of 10 different de-
linquent tax certificates; all the receipts showing 
that these certificates of delinquency had been 
14 
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taken out by different parties other than the res-
pondent. The respondent contends that it is suffic-
ient if the taxes for seven successive years have 
been paid, while it is the contention of the appell-
ants that these taxes must be paid each successive 
year. This is the construction which was placed up-
on this statute by this court in Tremmel v. Mess, 46 
Wash. 137, 89 Pac. 487, and we think that this is 
the reasonable construction. The construction of 
section 5503 of Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. 
(Pierce's Code, No. 1160) would be different from 
that of section 5504, because in the former section 
the person paying the taxes must be in open and 
notorious possession of the lands or tenements un-
der claim and color of title, while section 5504 pro-
vides for a case where there is no possession, and 
the payment of taxes annually would be to a cer-
tain extent notice to the owner of a claim against 
the land." (Emphasis ours.) 
Here, a distinction is made between cases involving the 
payment of taxes as the only requirement, and the cases 
involving adverse possession and the payment of taxes. 
This will be discussed later. 
(3) Kennedy v. Anderson, 88 Wash. 457, 153 P. 319: 
Action to reform a deed and to quiet title. 
The decision is based upon Section 5504, Ballinger's 
Ann. Codes & St. (Pierce's Code, No. 1161), and follows the 
case of Tremmel v. Mess, supra. The court says: 
"The appellants also claim title to the land in ques-
tion by reason of having paid taxes for seven years. 
But is appears plainly from the record that the land 
was not in the active possession of any one, but 
15 
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was entirely wild and unimproved; that in May, 
1912, when taxes were delinquent against this tract 
of land, the appellant redeemed some tax certifi-
cates and paid the taxes for the year 1912, making 
six years' taxes in all. We have held that, in order 
to acquire title by the payment of taxes upon va-
cant and unoccupied lots, as these lots were, the 
payment cannot be made in one sum, but must 
be made in successive years. Tremmel v. Mess, 46 
Wash. 137. 89 Pac. 487." (Emphasis ours.) 
SOUTH DAKOTA: 
(1) Cain v. Ehrler, 33 S. D. 536, 146 N. W. 694: 
South Dakota limitation statutes are taken from Illin-
ois and are practically identical to the Illinois statute. The 
case turns on what is Section 7 of the Illinois statute here-
tofore quoted. Only the payment of taxes is involved and 
no possession. 10 years' payment of taxes are required. 
The court states: 
"The taxes for the years 1895, 1896, and 1897 were 
were allowed to become delinquent, and the pro-
perty went to sale in payment thereof; but the re-
spondent redeemed from these sales by paying 
these taxes in full prior to the commencement of 
the action; and this, he contends, complied with 
the statute relative to the payment of taxes. In 
this contention appellant is wrong. A redemption 
from a delinquent tax sale is not a payment of the 
tax for which the sale was made, within the pro-
visions of this statute. Sections 54 and 55, Code 
Civ. Proc., are adopted from the statutes of the 
state of Illinois (Rev. St. Ill. 1899 No. 6, 7, C. 83), 
where the statute has been in force practically as 
it is now since 1839." 
16 
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This state, then, follows the Illinois rules quoted. 
(2) Bertrand v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 
33 S. D. 593, 146 N. W. 1914: This case follows Illinois 
under Section 7 above. No adverse possession is involved. 
COLORADO: 
(1) Webber v. Wannemaker, 39 Colo. 425, 89 Pac. 780. 
Construes Section 2923, 2 Mills' Ann. St., and 2923e, 3 
Mills' Ann. St. Rev. Supp. 
The opinion of the court states: 
"If the defendant paid the taxes for one of these 
years and the plaintiff did not, she cannot then 
invoke the statute. By such finding the court in 
effect holds that the plaintiff did not comply with 
the statute. The fact that the defendant paid 
them voluntarily would simply operate to prevent 
recovery from the plaintiff, but cannot assist the 
plaintiff to meet the plain requirements of the stat-
ute." 
Froni this quotation, it can be seen that the case turns 
on the fact that the defendant paid one year's taxes out 
of the seven. In the case now before this Supreme Court, 
Olson did not pay any taxes from 1933 to 1949 inclusive, but 
the plaintiffs and their predecessors paid all taxes assessed 
according to law from 1940 to 1949 inclusive, a period of ten 
years. This case is the same as Christensen v. Munster, 
(Utah), 266 P.2d 756, and is not a parallel case. The state-
ment that "Redemption from sale does not constitute pay-
ment of taxes," is merely dicta. 
17 
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There is a dearth of Colorado cases in which possession 
is involved. There are many which involve the statute 
similar to No. 7 of the Limitation laws of Illinois heretofore 
quoted, and from which the Colorado statute is taken. No. 
143, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, Vol. 2, Page 580 
is the same as No. 6 of the Illinois statutes. No. 144 of 
the same Colorado Statutes, is the same as No. 7 of the 
Illinois Statutes and does not require any possession. 
TEXAS: 
(2) Churchman v. Rumsey, et. al., (Texas) 166 S.W. 
2d 960. Action of Trespass to Try Title. 
Statutes construed: Article 5509, R. C. S. 1925, and 
Article 5510, R. C. S., 1925. 
Art. 5509, 567 4, 3342, 3193 FIVE YEARS' POSSESS-
ION, recites: 
"Every suit to recover real estate as against a per-
son having peaceable and adverse possession there-
of, cultivating, using or enjoying the same, and pay-
ing taxes thereon, if any, and claiming under a deed 
or deeds duly registered, shall be instituted within 
five years next after cause of action shall have 
accrued, and not afterward." 
Decision of the Court: 
"The law is well settled in this State that where 
title to land is claimed under the five-year statute 
of limitation, Article 5509, R. C. S. 1925 it must 
be shown that the taxes were paid before they be-
came delinquent and the party claiming such title 
must have had peaceable and adverse possession 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
thereof for the statutory period, cultivating, using 
and enjoying the same, concurrently with the pay-
ment of taxes before they became delinquent." 
(Cases cited.) 
(2) Hufstedler v. Barnett, (Texas) 182 S. W. 2d 504. 
This case is not in point for the reason that the taxes 
were paid by the adverser and he obtained his decree quiet-
ing title. Statements were quoted from Churchman v. Rum-
sey, supra. 
Texas is the only state in the union which holds pay-
ment of taxes before delinquency necessary in order to 
acquire title while in adverse possession, C. J. S. Adverse 
Possession, No. 176. The other states hold such to be the 
case where only the payment of taxes is involved in the 
statute and no possession is necessary. 
NEW MEXICO: 
As a preliminary statement to the New Mexico cases, 
attention is invited to the fact that Utah has a preliminary 
sale and an auditor's sale which are held over four years 
apart. New Mexico has only one sale and that is com-
parable to our auditor's sale or May sale. 
Under the New Mexico statutes, title passes to the pur-
chaser at the tax sale, and the tax lien is extinguished which 
is not the case in the preliminary sale in Utah. A discuss-
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(1) McGrail v. Fields, 53 N. M. 158, 203 P. 2d 1000. 
The comment is made that in this case the New Mexico 
court commits the same error as this Supreme Court has 
committed in the instant case. Cases which do not involve 
possession are confused with cases involving adverse possess-
ion. 
The case under consideration involved adverse possess-
ion. 
The facts set forth in McGrail v. Fields, supra, could 
not possibly make it a parallel case to the one at bar. The 
facts stated are these: 
"'W. F. Roark went into possession of the premises 
at the time of the attempted conveyance thereof 
to him by G. J. Moore on May 29, 1929; and the 
court found that W. F. Roark and his successors 
continued such possession for a period of ten years 
after May 29, 1929. On March 30, 1935, W. F. 
Roark and wife conveyed the premises to P. L. 
Hubby, the deed being filed for record on May 11, 
1937. The property was conveyed by P. L. Hubby 
and wife to Helen Fields, appellee, on October 3, 
1945. 
" 'The property was sold for taxes for the year 
1936, and Tax Sale Certificate No. 2697 was issued 
to C. M. Allred. Redemption was made therefrom 
by W. F. Roark by Redemption Certificate No. 
1552. It was again sold for taxes for the year 
1942, to the State of New Mexico, and Tax Sale 
Certificate No. 6609 was issued and assigned to 
B. L. Huchton. Redemption was made by M. B. 
Johnson by Redemption Certificate No. 3419.' 
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"'It is apparent from the record that Johnson was 
acting as agent for Hubby in redeeming this pro-
perty from tax sale.'" 
As shown in the next subdivision of this brief, title 
passes in New Mexico when the Certificate of Sale is issued. 
The property involved was sold to C. M. Allred, a stranger 
to the title, in 1936. In 1942 the property was sold to New 
Mexico, and the tax sale certificate assigned to another 
stranger to the title, B. L. Huchton. In both cases, redemp-
tion was made from this sale by the adversers, but the re-
demption was made to redeem their title which had passed 
to the purchasers. 
In Utah, no title passes and the tax lien is not extin-
guished when the preliminary tax sale is made and no as-
signment of any tax sale can be made to anyone but an 
iiicumbrancer, as hereinafter shown. No stranger to the 
title is involved in the case at bar. Morley Dean had a right 
to redeem from the sale to relieve his property from the tax 
lien and his title remaining in him, the redemption was a 
payment of taxes and not a redemption of his title. 
(2) Pueblo De Taos v. Gusdorf, 50 F. 2d 721, (New 
Mexico). 
The statutes of New Mexico involved in this case will 
be discussed in the next succeeding sub-heading of this brief. 
The case hinges on the following: 
'' 'The sale of land to the county discharged the 
claim for taxes. In lieu of such claim, the county 
21 
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took the legal title to claim No. 8 subject to the 
former owner's right of redemption. It had the 
right to sell such title evidenced by the certificate 
of sale at either a private sale for its face value, 
or at public sale to the highest bidder. The pay-
ment in question was made not to discharge a 
claim for taxes but to redeem claim No. 8 from 
the sale and to reinvest in the former owner the 
legal title thereto. It was not a payment of 
taxes.'" 
The preliminary sale in Utah does not convey the title 
to the county as shall be discussed later. The county has 
no right to sell, under Utah statutes, a preliminary tax sale 
certificate either at public or private sale. 
The two New Mexico cases are not parallel to our pre-
liminary sale and are not in point in the present discussion. 
In summary, it may be said that of the seventeen cases 
used by this Supreme Court in establishing its "majority 
rule", only two, the Texas cases, can in any way be held to 
be parallel to the case at bar. It is the only state which 
holds, that in cases involving adverse possession and the 
payment of taxes, the taxes must be paid before delinquency. 
In the instant case, the same ruling is made, inasmuch as 
our preliminary sale is held immediately after the delin-
quency date, and no title passes by such preliminary sale. 
In the instant case, at page 985 of the Pacific reporter, 
this court states: 
"Another and perhaps the most important con-
sideration is that one of the purposes of the statute 
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requiring payment of taxes in order to establish 
adverse possession is that by paying taxes on the 
land a public record is made which gives notice to 
the owner that his land is being claimed adversely. 
This purpose cannot be fulfilled if the possessor 
can wait any number of years, even up to the 
necessary seven, and then pay the taxes in one 
lump sum by redeeming. Under such circumstan-
ces the owner would get no current notice of ad-
verse claims against his property, and may not 
until it is too late to do anything about it." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
To support this contention, the case of McDonald v. 
McCoy, 121 Cal. 55, 53 P. 424, is cited. This case does not 
uphold the above contention but rests on the following: 
"In 1899 the administrator of the estate of Henry 
S. Burton, deceased, by virtue of the decree in the 
case of McDonald against Burton, above mentioned, 
was put into possession of Rancho Jamul. He con-
tinued in possession as such administrator until 
after the administrator's deed to plaintiff, Febru-
ary 18, 1895. * * * * While the administrator 
was in possession, no taxes were paid. The rancho 
was assessed for taxes each year, and the taxes 
were regularly allowed to become delinquent, and 
under the statute the land was sold to the state. 
After the probate sale in 1895, the administrator 
redeemed the property from these sales, by paying 
to the state the required amounts, and received 
certificates showing that a redemption had been 
affected. * * * * * No taxes were paid, even if 
such redemption could be called a payment of taxes, 
until he ceased to have or to claim any right to 
possession. But, though the redemption had been 
effected while he was still in possession claiming 
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title, it would not have been a compliance with 
the law. If there is anything of benefit to the 
state contemplated by this anomalous law, it is 
that it will have a tendency to induce people to 
pay their taxes, and not compel the state to take 
title subject to redemption." (Emphasis ours.) 
We have the same situation as in numerous other cases 
involved herein. In the above case the state took title which 
is not so in the instant case. It is to be noted in the above-
quoted case, that seven years' taxes were delinquent when 
redeemed, so that the situation is the same as it would be 
in this state after Auditor's Tax Deed has issued to the coun-
ty. 
Issue is taken with the court's ruling that in adverse 
possession cases, payment of the tax alone gives notice to 
the owner that his land is being claimed adversely. In 
adverse possession cases, it is the open, hostile, notorious 
and adverse possession which "waves the flag" and gives 
notice to the former owner. In cases which do not in-
volve adverse possession, but allow an adverser to obtain 
title by paying of taxes only, the consecutive paying of taxes 
each year is necessary to give notice that the land is being 
held adversely, Seymour v. Dufur, supra, Kennedy v. And-
erson, supra, Tremmel et al. v. Mess et al., supra, Robert-
son v. Bachman, supra, and many other like cases. In its 
opinion, this Supreme Court in the instant case has followed 
the rule laid down in cases which do not require adverse 
possession and the payment of taxes conjointly, but require 
merely the payment of taxes without possession. 
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SUBDzyiSION B. 
We have seen from the cases heretofore quoted which 
involve statutes requiring payment of taxes only as the re-
quisite for establishing title, that a rather stringent rule 
was adopted under such statutes to the effect that the only 
noice given to the better paper title holder that his land 
was claimed adversely, was by the continuous payment of 
taxes before they went to tax sale. We will now discuss 
those cases in the states holding to the "majority rule" men-
tioned in this court's opinion which require adverse possess-
ion as well as the payment of taxes. These are as follows: 
ILLINOIS: 
(1) Lewis v. Ward, 99 Ill., 525. Construing Section 
6 of the Limitations Act, Chapter 83, Limitations, Cahill 
Illinois Revised Statues, 1927, in effect since March 2nd, 
1839, which reads: 
"No. 6. Every person in the actual possession of 
lands or tenements, under claim and color of title, 
made in good faith, and who shall, for seven suc-
cessive years, continue in such possession, and shall 
also, during said time, pay all taxes legally assessed 
on such lands or tenements, shall be held and ad-
judged to be the legal owner of said lands or tene-
ments, to the extent and according to the purport 
of his or her paper title. All persons holding under 
such possession, by purchase, devise or descent, be-
fore said seven years shall have expired, and who 
shall continue such possession, and continue to pay 
the taxes as aforesaid, so as to complete the poss-
ession and payment of taxes for the term afore-
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said, shall be entitled to the benefit of this sec-
tion." 
In its opinion the court said: 
"It was also urged that the taxes which were leg-
ally assessed on this land, were not paid seven suc-
cessive years, by appellee, while he was in possess-
ion. This act of limitation was adopted by the 
legislature, and took effect on the second day of 
March, 1839, and as the appellee was then in poss-
ession, it began to run from that date, and the full 
period of the time limited expired at the end of 
seven years from that time. And we have seen 
that all the taxes on the land, except the city tax 
for the year 1846, were paid from 1839 to those 
assessed for the year 1846, without interruption, 
which embraced a period of seven full consecutive 
years. And it can make no difference whether 
the taxes for the year 1845 were paid within that, 
or the succeeding year, as he was still in the occu-
pancy, and made the payment under his claim and 
color of title. In either event it completed the 
payment of taxes for the period of limitation, and 
answers fully the requirements of this section of 
the statute. There was, then, actual possession, 
under claim and color of title, made in good faith, 
connected with payment of all taxes, legally assess-
ed upon the land, for the full period of limitation, 
and the bar to a recovery, by the former owner, 
was then complete and availing, and the appellee, 
as such occupant, became entitled to, and possessed 
of, all the rights which the statute can confer." 
(2) Hinchman v. Whetstone, 23 III. 108. Construing 
said Section 6 of the Illinois limitation statutes: 
"Although the taxes upon land may not have been 
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paid within each year for seven successive years, 
yet, if they were paid in one year for another of 
the seven, the party still being in possession under 
claim and color of title, the requirements of the 
statute of limitations, which took effect in 1839, 
will have been complied with." (Emphasis ours.) 
We wish to note here, that in lllinois and the states foll-
owing that state as hereinafter set out, in cases where ad-
verse possession and occupancy are involved, the so-called 
"majority rule" set out by this Supreme Court in Bowen 
vs. Olson, supra, does not apply. 
SOUTH DAKOTA: 
(1) Murphy v. Redeker, 94 NW 697; 16 S. Dak. 615; 
102 Am. St. Rep. 722. 
Construes Section 1, Chapter 24, page 78, Laws of 1891. 
This statute is the same as No. 6 of the limitation statutes 
of Illinois .. 
In its opinion the court said: 
"The application and legal effect of the foregoing 
statute are not controverted, but counsel for appel-
lent maintain that each payment must be made 
within the year for which the tax was levied and 
that a delay on the part of one of the earlier claim-
ants in paying the taxes of 1891 until July 9, 1892, 
is fatal to respondents' claim of ownership. With-
out placing upon the plain terms in which the Leg-
islature has spoken a construction different from 
the ordinary meaning of the words employed, and 
by which the real puurpose of the enactment would 
be often defeated, the contention of counsel is not 
sustainable. Beyond question, this payment of all 
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legal taxes during 10 successive years, by persons 
clearly within the statute in. every other respect, 
is a substantial compliance therewith, although 
the annual assessment becomes delinquent, and is 
not paid until the following year. Numerous states 
have provided for the acquisition of land by occu-
pants paying taxes in good faith under color of 
title for a specified number of years, and the Stat-
ute of Illinois is practically the same as our provis-
ion. above quoted. For many years the courts of 
that state, under a seven-year limitation, have held 
unswervingly upon the propostion as follows: 
"Although the taxes upon land may not have been 
paid within each year for seven successive years, 
yet, if they were paid in one year or another of the 
seven, the party still being in possession under 
claim and color of title, the requirements of the 
statute of limitations, which took effect in 1839, 
will have been complied with." Hinchman v. Whet-
stone, 23 Ill. 185." (Emphasis ours.) 
NORTH DAKOTA: 
(1) Stiles v. Granger, 17 N.D. 502, 117 N. W. 777. 
Construes Section 4928, Rev. Codes 1905, and reads: 
"The first question for determination is whether 
the purchase at tax sale December 6, 1898, for the 
taxes for the year 1897, by the appellant, consti-
tutes a payment within the meaning of the statute 
above quoted. Respondent urges that it is not a 
payment, and that the deed from Bowdle to appell-
ant within the terms of the statute referred to. 
The appellant contends that it does constitute pay-
ment, and that the deed held by him is adequate 
title to sustain his defense. When the oversight 
occurred, and the land was accidently sold to the 
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appellant, he was in possession, claimmg ownership, 
under his deed from Bowdle. It was his duty to 
pay the taxes. He bad for many years recognized 
this duty, and had paid them each year, and con-
tinued to pay them subsequent to the sale. No 
question of good faith is involved. He held his 
certificate nine years after the sale without mak-
ing application for a deed. The sa!e of land to the 
person claiming ownership and in possession, whose 
duty it is to pay the taxes, is void, and operates as 
a payment. The purchaser under such circumstan-
ces acquires no title by his purchase, and it is 
deemed to be only one method paying the taxes. 
Good faith is presumed, in the absence of evidence 
showing the contrary. Christy v. Fisher, 58 Cal. 
256, and cases cited; Smith v. Lewis et. al., 20 Wis. 
369; Bassett v. Welch, 22 Wis., 175; Whitney v. 
Gunderson, 31 Wis. 359 and 379; Murphy v. Red-
eker et. al., 16 S. D. 615, 94 N. W. 697, 102 Am. 
St. Rep. 722; Swan et. al. v. Rainey, 59 Ark. 364, 
27 S. W. 240; Douglas v. Dangerfield, 10 Ohio, 
1952; Morrison v. Norman, 47 Ill. 477; Davis v. 
Hall, 92 Ill. 85. Respondent cites some early Illin-
ois cases to the effect that a purchase at tax sale 
may not be a payment of the taxes, when made by 
the party in possession; but the court of that state 
fails to discuss the question, or the facts show that 
the good faith of the payment was involved, and 
that the purchase was made with the intention of 
acquiring a deed thereunder and with a hostile pur-
pose. In Lewis v. Ward, 99 Ill. 525, the Supreme 
Court of that state says: 'The law is well settled 
that certain persons, on account of their relations 
to the property or their obligations to pay the tax-
es thereon, are forbidden by the policy of the law 
to become purchasers of the lands at a tax sale. 
The rule admits of no exception that a purchase 
by one whose duty it is to pay the tax operates 
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as a payment and nothing more.' Had appellant 
intentionally omitted the payment of the 1897 tax, 
and purchased at the tax sale with the purpose of 
acquiring title under his purchase, a different case 
would be presented, and his good faith might well 
be questioned. Under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, we conclude that the purchase by 
the appellant was a payment of the taxes for the 
year 1897, within the requirement of section 4928, 
supra." 
In construing this case, this Supreme Court in Bowen 
v. Olson, supra, on page 984 of the Pacific Reporter states: 
"The North Dakota case of Stiles v. Granger is 
distinguishable, the court having rested its de-
cision on the special fact of mistake or inadvertence 
because an agent failed to pay the taxes as instruc-
ted, and the court said that a different result might 
be reached if the failure to pay had been intention-
al." 
The quotation made herein from the above case of Stiles 
v. Granger goes further than intimated by this Supreme 
Court. It holds that in cases where "POSSESSION" is in-
volved, that a purchase at the final tax sale by the tax title 
purchaser who has been in possession for a number of years, 
and whose duty it is to pay the taxes, amounts to a PAY-
MENT OF TAXES. North Dakota has only one tax sale. 
Utah has two, the preliminary sale and the auditor's sale 
as hereinafter fully discussed. The property is not offered 
for sale to the public until the auditor's sale in May, four 
years after the preliminary tax sale. It is this final auditor's 
sale that the North Dakota case is talking about, and if 
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Morley Dean had let his taxes go the four years, and bid in 
the property at the May Sale of 1952, it would have been the 
payment of taxes under the ruling laid down by the North 
Dakota court and the states it quotes. 
WASHINGTON: 
(1) Lara v. Sandell, et. ux., 52 Wash. 58, 100 Pac. 166: 
Construes Section 5503, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. 
(Pierce's Code, No. 1160), which reads as follows: 
"Every person in actual, open and notorious poss-
ession of lands or tenements under claim and color 
of title, made in good faith, and who shall for seven 
successive years continue in possession and shall 
also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed 
on such lands or tenements, shall be held and ad-
judged to be the legal owner of said lands or tene-
ments, to the extent and according to the purport 
of his or her paper title." 
The opinion reads: 
''The necessary prerequisites under this section are: 
(1) Claim and color of title made in good faith; 
(2) actual, open, and notorious possession con-
tinued for seven successive years; and (3) payment 
of all taxes legally assessed during that time. What-
ever the rule may be in other jurisdictions, it is 
firmly established in this state that a void tax 
deed may constitute a sufficient basis for the run-
ning of the statute of limitations. Hamilton v. 
Witner, 97 Pac. 1084, and cases cited. And we 
think it clearly appears from the record before 
us that the respondents were in actual, open, and 
notorious possession of the lands in controversy 
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under claim and color of title made in good faith, 
and that such possession continued for upwards of 
seven successive years prior to the commencement 
of the present action. The appellant contends, 
however, that the three prerequisites we have men-
tioned must exist concurrently without interrup-
tion, and must continue throughout the entire sev-
en-year period, and that it does not appear that 
seven years elapsed between the date of the first 
payment of taxes under claim and color of title 
made in good faith and the commencement of this 
action. This contention is based largely on decis-
ions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and it must 
be conceded that under the decisions of that court 
the period of adverse possession does not com-
mence to run until a tax payment has been made. 
Glos v. Wheeler, 229 Ill. 272, 82 N. E. 235. This 
court followed the Illinois cases in Tremmel v. 
Mess, 46 Wash. 137, 89 Pac. 487. in construing 
section 5504, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. (Pierce's 
Code, No. 1161), which relates to vacant and un-
occupied lands, but under that section it is quite 
manifest that the statute of limitations or adverse 
possession cannot commence to run until there has 
been a payment of taxes, for there is nothing else 
to mark the commencement of the statutory per-
iod. It seems to us that this rule should not apply 
in construing section 5503. The only requirement 
of the latter section is that the adverse possession 
shall be continued for seven years, and that the 
occupant shall pay all taxes legally assessed during 
that time. To hold that seven years of adverse 
possession is not complete until seven years have 
elapsed after the first payment of taxes under claim 
and color of title made in good faith is to add ma-
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(2) Seymour v. Dufur, 53 Wash. 646, 112 P. 756 here-
tofore quoted says: 
''The construction of section 5503 of ·Ballinger's 
Ann. Codes & St. (Pierce's Code, No. 1160) would 
be different from that of section 5504, because in 
the former section the person paying the taxes 
must be in open and notorious possession of the 
lands or tenements under claim and color of title, 
while section 5504 provides for a case where there 
is no possession, and the payment of taxes annually 
would be to a certain extent notice to the owner 
of a claim against the land." 
NEW MEXICO: 
United States v. Wooten et. al. 40 F. (2d), 882. 
"The United States, as guardian of the Indians of 
the Pueblo of Taos, sued to quiet title to 78 tracts 
of land; the decision of the trial court was adverse 
to the government as to part of the tracts; and 
this appeal challenges the correctness of the decree 
as to twelve of them. While the facts differ some-
what in the twelve cases, one fact is common to 
all of the cases, and that is that taxes levied by 
the state upon the lands prior to June 7, 1924 
(the date of the Pueblo Lands Act (25 USCA No. 
331 note) ) , were not paid by the defendants prior 
to delinquency. When claimants must pay taxes 
in order to avail themselves of the rights given 
adverse possessors by the Pueblo Lands Act is the 
principal question in the case." 
"We conclude that a claimant of Pueblo lands must 
(a) prove the adverse possession described by the 
act from the respective dates to June 7, 1924; (b) 
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that he must have paid all taxes on the lands 
claimed which were assessed and levled in con-
formity with the New Mexico laws from the re-
spective dates to June 7, 1924, unless exempt 
therefrom; (c) that the extent of the payment re-
quired is measured by section 3365, Code of 1915. 
"IV. Section 3365 requires that the claimant shall 
have 'for the period mentioned in this section con-
tinuously paid all the taxes' levied by state or mun-
icipal authorities. Save in one or two instances 
separately noticed, it is conceded that prior to the 
filing of this suit, in 1927, the claimants, or their 
predecessors in interest, had paid all such taxes 
which were assessed from 1899, or 1902, down to 
and including 1924; by 1927, they had paid up 
all the taxes, interest, and penalties, levied during 
the period involved, and were square with the 
state. The payments had not been interrupted by 
others paying or by failure to pay for certain years, 
or by tax deeds. However, in none of the cases 
had the taxes for all of the years been paid before 
delinquency. The government contends that the 
taxes must not only all be paid, but each year's 
taxes must be paid before delinquency; that a sett-
ler loses his rights if the 1906 tax, for example, was 
not paid until July of 1907. 
"This argument is grounded upon the word 'con-
tinuously,' which we had supposed meant without 
break or interruption. Counsel for the govern-
ment, in his brief, defines it otherwise variously 
as 'regularly,' 'promptly and completely,' 'prompt-
ly and regularly,' with 'punctuality,' 'when due,' 
etc. Suffice it is to say, that, unless there is con-
trolling authority, or commending reason from the 
context, this court cannot construe 'continuously' 
into 'promptly.' If Congress had intended that 
the claim of these settlers should be defeated if, 
at any time in the 22-year stretch, the settler had 
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not paid his taxes until they became delinquent, 
it could easily have said so by inserting the words 
'promptly' or 'before delinquency.' Or, if the New 
Mexico Legislature had intended the same thing, 
it could have accomplished the result sought, by 
similar wording in section 3365. When two legis-
lative bodies have overlooked the opportunity to 
aptly word their statutes to express a requirement 
of punctuality, we are not justified in supplying 
the omission. 
"Counsel contends that the act requires that claim-
ants 'must have paid all taxes continuously from 
1899, or 1902, to 1924.' The act is otherwise; it 
requires payment of taxes 'levied thereon * * * * 
from the 16th day of March, 1899, to the date of 
the passage of this Act.' Section 4 (b) . That 
is, the time limits apply to levy and not to pay-
ment. Counsel further contends that the word 
'all' in the New Mexico statute required that the 
taxes must be completely paid; that, therefore, 
continuously must be construed as 'before delin-
quency' or be given no meaning. As we read this 
statute, one claiming under it must show that he 
has paid 'all' (not a part of those levied) 'continu-
ously' (for each of the years of the period). But 
even if it be tautology, that common fault of leg-
islative draftsmen does not, in our opinion, justify 
impressing upon a word a meaning it does not have. 
"The New Mexico courts have not construed the 
statute; many cases, from other jurisdictions, have 
been cited as bearing upon the necessity of pay-
ment of taxes before delinquency, where there is a 
taxpaying requirement in an adverse possession 
statute. We have examined these cases, and the 
statutes upon which they are based. There is not 
complete harmony in the cases; but to discuss the 
cases would require an analysis of the statutes, and 
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unduly prolong this opinion. __ After all, each statute 
has its own background, which must not be over-
looked. This act of Congress was passed to meet a 
peculiar situation that arose after the decision of 
the Sandoval and Candelaria Cases. In very rough 
outline, we think Congress intended to protect the 
rights of settlers who would have acquired property 
rights, w~thout color of title, under the New Mexico 
law as it existed prior to March 16, 1899. Where 
there was color of t1tle, Congress used the date 
of 10 years prior to statehood; and recognized such 
claims resting on possess1on and color of title since 
January 6, 1902. But to both classes, it made addi-
tional requirements-a continued possession on 
down to 1924, and the taxpaying requirement. It 
agreed to recognize claims so accrued, provided 
that the claim and possession had continued until 
1924, without interruption. It was concerned with 
the good faith of the settler, and was saying that 
a settler who has claimed ownership through the 
years must be consistent; if he claimed ownership 
to the Pueblo Lands Board, he must have assumed 
ownership to the state through the years, by pay-
ing taxes like other owners. In short, there is no 
reason apparent why a harsher burden should be 
put on these settlers, as to their taxes, than on 
their neighbors. Under the New Mexico law, the 
owner can go to the office of the treasurer, and, 
as a matter of right, clear his land of all tax claims, 
by paying the taxes, interest, penalties, and costs, 
at any time before tax sale. The ordinary man, 
reading this statute, would conclude that he is 'pay-
ing taxes, if he pays money to a county treasurer to 
discharge his property of liens arising from assess-
ments made by taxing authorities. If, in 1924, all 
the taxes levied since 1899 had been paid by John 
Smith; if during those years no one else had paid 
them or had a right to pay them; if he has never 
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let the land go to tax sale-we think John Smith 
can honestly say that he has continuously paid all 
the taxes levied on the !and since 1899." (Empha-
sis ours.) 
(NOTE: The tax sale referred to is comparable with 
our May sale or Auditor's Sale and does not in any way 
contemplate our preliminary sale.) 
"We agree with counsel for the government that 
'Congress evidently made tax payments a portion 
of the test, because the full and regular payment of 
taxes is the best evidence of a genuine and contin-
uous claim of title in good faith.' We agree that 
the circumstances of delinquency might be such 
that it would reflect upon the good faith of his 
possession, as required in other parts of the section, 
even if the payments are made 'continuously' as 
herein interpreted; but here the trial court has 
found good faith, and its finding in that respect is 
not challenged. 
"Although it has not been urged, we have noted 
that in the 1899 amendment the word 'continuous-
ly' is not used in connection with the taxpaying re-
quirement, but was first used in the 1905 amend-
ment. Ordinarily the insertion of a word in a 
statute by amendment should be accorded particu-
lar significance. However, in the 1899 amendment 
the taxpaying requirement was a part of the sent-
ence requiring possession 'continuously'; by the 
1905 amendment, the taxpaying requirement was 
separated from the word 'continuously.' In any 
event, to construe the word as 'promptly' or 'before 
delinquency' appears to us to be unjustified, and 
not in keeping with the spirit of the statute. We 
therefore hold that, if a settler has paid all the 
taxes assessed, with penalties and interest, for all 
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of the years involved, prior to the filing of the 
·suit, and prior to tax sale, he has complied with 
the taxpaying requirement of the act. The ques-
tion of whether taxes may be paid after tax sale, 
but before the expiration of the period of redemp-
tion, is not presented by this record, and is not de-
cided. 
"V. With reference to the particular claims: In 
some of the claims the evidence showed that for 
a particular year the taxes were not paid at all. 
The trial court held that the taxes were not 'law-
fully assessed and levied' because of errors in the 
description. The New Mexico Supreme Court has 
just decided, in the case of Ferguson v. Gusdorf, 
290 P. 214, that descriptions in tax assessments 
must be 'sufficient, unaided, to identify the land.' 
That decision is under an early statute, but on the 
whole we conclude that the trial court correctly 
applied the New Mexico statutes. As to one claim, 
No. 76, the evidence shows that the taxes from 
1919 to 1924 had not been paid when the suit was 
filed. During the progress of the trial, a state 
court decreed that the assessment was unlawful, 
in that it was excessive, and the description indef-
inite. The question presented to the trial court 
in this case was whether, at the date of filing the 
petition, any taxes 'lawfully assessed' were un-
paid. The trial court necessarily found this assess-
unlawful. The state court has also so decreed. 
The claims cannot be defeated therefore because 
of the nonpayment of unlawful assessments. The 
circumstances concerning the taxes on this pro-
perty reflect upon the good faith of the claim of 
possession; but the trial court has found good 
faith; the finding is not attacked, and the evidence 
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Reference is now made to states following the "min-
ority rule" set up by this court in its opinion in the instant 
case on page 984 of the Pacific Reporter. 
MONTANA: 
This state follows illinois in its taxing procedure and 
the adverse possession statutes are similar to our state. 
(1) Laas v. All Persons Claiming Any Interest, etc., 
(Montana), 189 P.2d 670. 
This case involves adverse possession. 
This is one of the cases which this Supreme Court held 
in Bowen v. Olson, supra, was a minority case. This may 
be true if the cases which require only the payment of taxes 
and no possession are included in the summary. But if on 
analysis of all of the cases, the cases to be considered are 
limited to those which require adverse possession as well as 
the payment of taxes, the cases are all in harmony except 
those of Texas. 
In this case, it is to be noted that no tax sales have 
been made. There is also nothing in the opinion to show 
that any redemption has been made of any final sale. How-
ever, in quoting statutes and cases of other states, the rule 
of redemption from a tax sale is applied. The rules set forth 
in Hinchman v. Whetstone, supra, Murphy v. Redeker, su-
pra, and other cases cited herein are all made a part of 
the decision. Further mention of this case will be given in 
the next succeeding section of this brief. 
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CALIFORNIA: 
The California statutes and the statutes of Utah are 
the most nearly alike of any of the states. Sections 322, 
323, 324 and 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California 
statutes are very comparable to our statutes. Likewise, 
Deerings California Codes, under Revenue and Taxation, 
Volume 1, page 192, Section 3436, et. seq., entitled "Sale 
to State by operation of law," under Chapter 2, and Volume 
1, Chapter 4, page 198, Section 3510, et. seq., entitled "Deed 
to State", are more nearly like our Article 8, and Article 
11, of our Revenue and Taxation Statute, Title 59, U. C. A. 
1953. 
There seems to be a conflict of authority in California 
as set out in the footnote 10, on page 984 of the reporter. 
An examination of the cases shows no conflict whatsoever 
in any of the cases. First let us examine the cases wherein 
it is said that the rule of redemption from tax sale being 
the payment of taxes is not applied. 
(1) McDonald v. McCoy, 121 Cal. 55, 53 P. 424. 
"In that case, however, it appeared that the per-
son in possession had failed to pay any taxes dur-
ing his possession, and that the redemption took 
place after he had ceased to have possession or 
to claim any right thereto. In such a case there 
may be good ground for saying that a subsequent 
payment of the taxes by way of redemption from 
such sale would not relate back to and aid the 
previous possession so as to make it adverse from 
the tiine of the tax sale to the time of such re-
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demption." Quoted from Owsley v. Matson, 156 
Cal. 401, 104 P. 983. 
(2) Myron v. Smith, 117 Cal. App. 355, 4 P.2d 219. 
Smith, a tax title purchaser, was defendant in the case. 
The defendant was not in possession in good faith. It was 
held that he had no adverse possession, and had not paid 
the taxes for the full five-year period. 
(3) Gallo v. Gallo, 31 Cal. App. 189, 159 Pac. 1058. 
"It is very clear to us that the defendant did not 
sustain his plea of adverse possession.'' 
* * * * * 
"The defendant did not personally occupy the 
land. No one nor all of the persons to whom he 
leased it ever occupied it for any five consecutive 
years.'' 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that there was no 
continuous possession and that the case did not revolve 
primarily upon a case where there was adverse possession 
and the payment of taxes was the only thing to be decided. 
Now we come to the cases holding that redemption is 
the payment of taxes. 
(4) Owsley v. Matson, 156 Cal. 401, 104 P. 983. 
This case holds: 
"But where, as in the present case, the tax has 
been allowed to become delinquent and a sale has 
taken place, and, so far as appears, a redemption 
has been made thereof, while the party or his sue-
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cessor in interest was in undisturbed possession, 
and all this is done in good faith, we see no reason 
why the same should not be held to operate as a 
payment, and we think it is sufficient to bring the 
occupant within the terms of the statute which 
requires him to pay the taxes upon the property 
claimed." (Emphasis ours.) 
In the case of Bowen v. Olson, supra, at the top of page 
985, this Supreme Court attempts to make parallel cases 
out of Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 99 Cal. 672, 34 P. 509, Ows-
ley v. Matson, supra, and Christensen v. Munster, Utah, 266 
P.2d 756. There is no parallel in the cases in this respect: 
In the California cases, there were two separate assessments 
of a part or all of the same property. The California court 
held that payment by the adverser of the taxes assessed to 
him was sufficient payment. In the Utah case, there was 
but one assessment, and the prior owner paid the taxes 
before the adverser tried to pay the same tax assessment. 
It is illogical to suppose that the party paying taxes assessed 
to him would be intending thereby to pay taxes assessed 
to another party. In the Utah case, the party paying first, 
paid taxes which were assessed to the other party and did 
so intentionally. 
(5) Gray v. Walker, 157 Cal. 381; 108 Pac. 278. 
The court says: 
"The fact that in one year the land was sold for 
delinquent taxes, and subsequently redeemed by 
plaintiff, did not prevent the acquisition of title 
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(6) Devlin v. Powell, 67 Cal. App. 165, 227 P. 231. 
The court says: 
"The point is made by appellant that certain of 
the taxes were allowed to become delinquent, but 
it appears from the transcript that these taxes 
were subsequently paid, and that redemption was 
had of the property while the plaintiffs and their 
grantors were in the undisputed possession, and 
therefore the rights of the plaintiffs in this partic-
ular are the same as though the taxes had not been 
allowed to go delinquent." Quotes Owsley v. Mat-
son, supra. 
The distinguishing characteristic in the first three 
cases above cited and the last three is definitely very clear. 
If the taxes go delinquent and are redeemed while the ad-
verser is in actual adverse possession, redemption is the 
payment of the taxes. If taxes are redeemed while the ad-
verser is not in possession, the rule is otherwise. 
SUBDIVISION C. 
The different statutes of the various states applicable 
to tax sales will now be discussed. This division of the brief 
will show the difference between the tax sales of the various 
states and our own preliminary sale and May sale or audi-
tor's sale. 
ARKANSAS: 
DIGEST OF STATUTES, ARKANSAS, KIRBY & 
CASTLE, 1916, page 2023: 
"SECTION 87 46. The collector shall make out 
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and deliver to the purchaser of any land, or town 
or city lot, or parts thereof sold for delinquent 
taxes as aforesaid, a certificate of purchase, for 
which the collector shall receive twenty-five cents, 
to be taxed as costs of sale therein, describing the 
lands or lots as the same were described in the 
notice of sale, stating therein what part of such 
tracts of land, town or city lot was sold, and the 
amount of taxes, penalty and costs paid therefor. 
Such certificate shall be assignable in law, and 
an assignment shall vest in the assignee or his 
legal representatives all the right, title and estate 
of the original purchaser. 
SECTION 8747. The clerk of the county court 
shall, immediately after the sale, transfer upon 
the tax-books all lands sold for taxes, to the name 
of the purchaser, charging him therefor the sum 
of ten cents for each tract, which shall be charged 
and paid as part of the cost of sale (118) ." 
ILLINOIS: 
Cahill Illinois Revised Statutes, 1927, pages 2105, et. 
seq. gives a very clear picture of the tax sale procedure of 
Illinois. This procedure is very lengthy and cannot be 
quoted here. The pertinent parts are set forth as follows: 
1. The tax lien is foreclosed and an order of sale ob-
tained from the court. 
2. The tax lien is extinguished by the sale. 
3. The property upon which there is delinquent taxes 
is offered to the public. 
4. The title to the property passes to the purchaser. 
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5. A two year redemption period is given before the 
deed is issued. 
6. No further action or advertisement by the county 
itself is required to issue the final tax deed. 
COLORADO: 
Mills Annotated Statutes (Revised Edition), pages 1075 
to 1099 gives procedure for tax sales. Colorado follows 
Illinois, and the same basic rules apply to the Colorado sales 
as set forth above. This state likewise has a two year re-
demption period after tax sale. 
SOUTH DAKOTA: 
Statutes taken from Illinois. 
Provides for a single sale and a two year redemption 
period. 
NORTH DAKOTA: 
Statutes taken from Illinois although procedure is less 
complicated. 
Two year redemption period after final sale allowed. 
WASHINGTON: 
Statutes are taken from Illinois and the same foreclos-
ure proceeding on tax sales is used. Section 9253, Reming-
ton and Ballinger's Codes and Statues of Washington, Vol-
ume 2, page 2113, provides: 
"4: Such certificate (the tax sale certificate) shall 
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have the same force and effect as a judgment exe-
cution and sale of and against the premises in-
cluded therein." 
The statutes provide for judgment on the tax delin-
quency and a sale at which the above certificate of sale is 
issued. The Tax Deed may be obtained at any time within 
three years, and until the tax deed is obtained, redemption 
may be made. 
MONTANA: 
While this is a "minority rule" state, it likewise follows 
the same tax sale procedure as Illinois. Three years are 
allowed after tax sale in which to redeem. See Revised 
Codes of Montana, 1947, Volume 5, Taxation, Chapter 41. 
The state may obtain a deed for the property sold to the 
state at any time after three years, but is not compelled 
to do so. Redemption from the county can take place any 
time before the tax deed is issued. 
From the foregoing, the conclusions are reached, that 
illinois, followed by Colorado, South Dakota, North Dakota, 
Washington and Montana, have a redemption period from a 
lone sale which is comparable to our May sale or auditor's 
sale, and not from what is known as our preliminary sale. 
Title passes at this sale, subject to the various redemption 
periods. The offering is made to the public, and if no pur-
chaser is available, the property is forfeited or deeded to 
the state or county. In all cases, the tax collector or county 
treasurer is relieved of the collection of taxes, and the tax 
lien is extinguished by the sale. 
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TEXAS: 
Article 7281 Vernon's Civil Statutes of the State of 
Texas, Volume 20, page 522, shows the tax sale procedure 
which divests the delinquent taxpayer of title. Inasmuch 
as Texas holds to the rule that under its five year adverse 
possession statute, allowing taxes to become delinquent for 
one year will toll the statute, there is no point in discussing 
the effect of a redemption from a tax sale. 
NEW MEXICO: 
Pueblo DeTaos v. Gusdorf, 50 F. (2d) 721. 
Quoting Chapter 22, Section 23, New Mexico Laws, 1899 
and acts amendatory thereto: 
"After receiving the amount for which and real 
estate shall be sold, the collector shall execute and 
deliver to the purchaser thereof a certificate of 
sale containing a description of the property sold 
and stating the name of the person or persons 
against whom the same was assessed, or that the 
same was assessed against unknown owners, as 
the case may be, the amount paid therefor, that 
it was sold for taxes, the amount and for the year 
or years for which the taxes were assessed, the 
amount of interest, penalties and costs, the date 
of sale, and the consideration or amount so paid 
therefor at such sale, that the collector, by virtue 
of the authority vested in him by law, has sold 
and does convey said real estate to said purchaser, 
his heirs and assigns, subject to the right of the 
former owner to redeem the same within three 
years from date of sale by paying to the purchaser, 
his heirs or assigns, the amount paid therefor at 
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such sale with interest thereon at the rate of one 
and one-half per cent per month from date of sale. 
Such certificate must be recorded in the office 
of the probate clerk of such county, in a book to 
be kept for the purpose of recording such certifi-
cates and when so recorded, shall vest in the pur-
chaser, his heirs or assigns, a complete legal title 
to the real estate described therein, subject, how-
ever, to redemption as herein provided, and such 
property shall thereafter, unless redeemed, be as-
sessed in the name of the purchaser, or his assigns, 
but the former owner shall have the right to re-
deem the same at any time within three years 
from the date of sale by paying to the collector 
then in office for the use of the purchaser the 
amount of purchase money with interest at the 
rate of one and one-half per cent per month from 
date of such sale, together with any taxes that 
may have been paid upon such real estate by the 
purchaser and assignees with interest thereon at 
the same rate; and such former owner may retain 
possession of said real estate until redeemed, or 
until the time of redemption has expired." 
In reasoning on this case, the court said: 
"Had the sale been made to a third person rather 
than to the county, the payment, under the provis-
ions of section 23, supra, would have been made 
to the county treasurer for the benefit of such 
third person, and neither the territory nor any of 
its political sub-divisions would have received any 
part thereof. Under such circumstances, it clearly 
would not have been a payment of taxes. 
"Section 23, supra, expressly declares that the 
county purchasing at tax sales shall take the same 
rights as an ordinary purchaser, and that the cer-
tificate of sale, when recorded, shall vest in the 
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purchaser, his heirs or assigns a complete legal 
title to the land, subject to redemption within three 
years from the date sale. 
"Section 22, supra, provides that, upon a sale to 
the county 'the collector shall make an entry 
"sold to the county" on the tax roll opposite the 
tax and shall be credited with the amount thereon 
in his settlement.' 
"The sale of land to the county discharged the 
claim for taxes. In lieu of such claim, the county 
took the legal title to claim No. 8 subject to the 
former owner's right of redemption. It had the 
right to sell such title evidenced by the certificate 
of sale at either a private sale for its face value, 
or at public sale to the highest bidder. The pay-
ment in question was made not to discharge a 
claim but to redeem claim No. 8 from the sale 
and. to reinvest in the former owner the legal title 
thereto. It was not a payment of taxes." 
(2) McGrail v. Fields, 203 P (2d), 1000. 
NEW MEXICO STATUTES 1941 ANNOTATED. Vol-
ume 5, page 1084. Section 76-708. 
"76-708. Title vested by tax title-Easements-
Possession-State as purchaser.- The t-ax sale 
certificate shall vest in the purchaser, his heirs, 
successors and assigns, or the state and its success-
ors and assigns, as the case may be, subject to the 
right of redemption as provided in this act, the 
right to a complete title to the property described 
therein; subject, however, to the easements of any 
telephone, telegraph, transmission, or pipe-line com-
pany or any irrigation or drainage ditch or road 
to which transmission, or pipe-line company or any 
irrigation or drainage ditch or road to which such 
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land may be subject, provided, that the purchaser 
shall not be entitled to the possession of said pro-
perty until the period of redemption has expired 
and a deed has been executed therefor. The state 
shall be deemed a purchaser within the meaning 
of this act. (Laws 1934 (S. S.), ch. 27, No. 9, 
p. 94; 1939, ch. 171', No. 1, p. 384.)" 
"76-717. Tax Deed-Special assessment liens-
Title-Easements-Fees-Property sold to State.-
'' At any time after the expiration of two ( 2) years 
from the date of the tax sale certificate, where the 
property has not been redeemed, on demand of 
the holder of the tax sale certificate, the presenta-
tion thereto to the county treasurer, and the pay-
ment in full of any and all taxes and interest unpaid 
at the date of application for deed, except as pro-
vided in section 33 (No. 76-634) thereof, the coun-
ty treasurer shall issue and deliver to the legal own-
er and holder of said tax sale certificate a tax 
deed to the property described therein. * * * * 
Such deed shall vest in the grantee, his heirs, suc-
cessors, and assigns, a perfect and complete title to 
the premises free and clear of all liens and en-
cumbrances, except as hereinafter provided in this 
section, which deed shall be substantially in the 
following form:" 
"County treasurers shall issue a deed to the state 
of New Mexico in the form as in this act provided, 
and shall execute separate deeds for the property 
described in each tax sale certificate sold to the 
state and not assigned, upon the expiration of the 
period of redemption.'' 
From a close examination of all of the statutes regard-
ing tax taxes of the states quoted as above set forth, the tax 
sale procedure has the following effect: 
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1. The property is offered at a public sale to any bid-
der who may desire to purchase. 
2. The certificate of the tax sale passes title to the pro-
perty sold, to the purchaser or to the state, and in some 
states the title is forfeited to the state. 
3. The certificate of tax sale may be assigned by the 
private purchaser or assigned or sold by the state or county 
to any private individual. 
4. By the tax sale, the tax lien is extinguished. 
5. By the tax sale, the tax collector or county treasurer 
as the case may be is credited in full with the amount of 
the sale. 
6. The redemptioner of the tax sale pays the amount 
bid at the sale to redeem his title and not to pay to the tax 
collector or county treasurer the delinquent taxes, penalty, 
interest and costs. 
As previously stated, California has a procedure some-
what similar to our own. At the preliminary sale, no public 
sale is held and the property as a matter of law is sold to 
the state as it is in our state. The redemption period in 
California is five years, and then the tax deed issues auto-
matically, as it did in Utah before the passage of our 1939 
statute. 
Comparing the Utah statutes of 1943 which were in 
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1. Originally No. 6018, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, 
in our first sale, provided for a sale to the public, with the 
county receiving the property if no bid was made. 
By Chapter 139, Laws of Utah, 1921, page 381, the lands 
could not be sold for a current delinquency to a private per-
son, but had to be sold to the county. This was carried 
into Section 80-10-32, R. S. U. 1933, and the same section 
in U. C. A. 1943. This was the law in effect at the time 
of the 1947 sale in question here. 
At the second sale, commonly called the May Sale and 
the Auditor's Sale, the following procedure was held in 
cases where the property was sold to the county. 
Section 6065, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, provides 
for a sale to the public after the Auditor's Tax Deed has 
been issued to the county conveying the title to the county. 
Said Section 6056, was amended by Sessions Laws of Utah, 
1921, page 384, Chapter 140. Section 80-10-68, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933 is the amended section for said Sec-
tion 6056. Section 80-10-68 was amended by Laws of Utah, 
1939, Chapter 101, and said amendment re-wrote the entire 
section, providing for the sale by the auditor BEFORE the 
title passed to the county, to the general public, and if no 
bids were received, then the fee simple title passed to the 
county in May. This was carried into Section 80-10-68, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, applicable in this case. 
As to the proposition that the property must be offered 
to the public before the "majority rule" can be followed, the 
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only sale we have offering the land to the public is our 
May sale or Auditor's Sale after the redemption period has 
expired. 
2. Originally, there was a certificate of sale in Utah. 
This was provided for in Sections 6020 and 6021, Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1917. No title passed by this certificate. It 
could be issued to a private person or to the county. These 
two sections were amended by Chapter 1939, Session Laws 
of Utah, 1921, page 381. By this amendment, the sale was 
restricted to the county only and private persons could not 
bid. The amended sections 6020 and 6021 became Sections 
80-10-34 and 80-10-35, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. The 
1933 code was amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1939, 
the amendment abolishing the tax sale certificate and pro-
viding for a tax sale record certified by one certificate of 
the county treasurer for all sales. Sections 80-10-33, 80-10-
34 and 80-10-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, carried for-
ward Sections 6020 and 6021, and former sections 80-10-34 
and 80-10-35. The 1943 code was in effect when the 1947 
sale was made. There was no tax sale certificate at that 
time. No title passed to the county or anyone else. 
3. Section 6023, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, pro-
vided for the sale by the county of its certificate of sale. 
Any person could become the purchaser at private sale. 
The certificate was assigned by the auditor to the purchas-
er. The purchaser had to pay all of the delinquent taxes, 
penalty, interest and costs. The sale was still subject to 
redemption by the former owner by paying the delinquent 
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taxes, penalty, interest and costs, the interest to be 1% per 
month. Chapter 122, Session Laws of Utah, 1919, page 
339, amended this section to limit the assignment to "any 
person or corporation holding a recorded mortgage or other 
lien against such real estate." The general public could no 
longer obtain assignments of certificates of sale made to 
the county. The said section, as amended, became Section 
80-10-36, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Laws of Utah, 
1939, Chapter 101, amended this section, and carried it 
forward into Section 80-10-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
which was in effect in 1947. The 1939 amendment and the 
1943 code set up an "Assignment of Interest Under Tax 
Sale." There is no provision for passing of title. 
4. There is no provision in Title 80, U. C. A., 1943, 
for the tax lien to be extinguished by the preliminary sale. 
In fact, the reverse is true if the discussion· in paragraph 
5 hereafter is considered. 
5. Under this heading, Section 80-10-63, U. C. A. 1943, 
provides as follows: 
"The auditor shall thereupon audit the books and 
records of the treasurer and shall have a final 
settlement with him. In making such settlement 
he shall credit the treasurer upon the account pro-
vided for in section 80-8-8 with the amount of 
taxes for the previous year which are found to be 
still unpaid and shall then charge the treasurer 
upon the books of the county in an account which 
shall be called the delinquent tax control account 
with the full amount of delinquent taxes, penalty 
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The lien for the taxes is not extinguished. The taxes 
are merely delinquent and a new account is made settlng 
up the delinquencies, penalty and costs not as the amounts 
due from a sale but as a matter of law for the collection of 
the taxes. The treasurer is still required to collect these de-
linquent taxes, penalties and costs. This is entirely differ-
ent than any other state except California. Our preliminary 
sale does not absolve the treasurer from further duties, in 
the collecting of delinquent taxes. 
6. Section 80-10-59, U. C. A. 1943, provides for redemp-
tion from our preliminary sale. He may do so by paying 
the delinquent taxes, interest, penalty and costs, and not 
by paying an amount previously bid at any sale. No title 
having passed, these delinquent taxes are a lien, and redemp-
tion is made to remove the lien and not to reinvest the owner 
with legal title. The statute reads in part: 
"The county treasurer shall accept and credit on 
account for the redemption of property sold for 
delinquent taxes, at any time prior to the expiration 
of the period of redemption, payments in amounts 
of not less than $10 except the final payment which 
may be in any amount. For the purpose of com-
puting the amount required for redemption and for 
the purpose of making distribution, of the payments 
received on the account thereof, all such payments 
shall be applied in the following order: 
''First, against the interest accrued upon the de-
linquent tax for the last year included in said de-
linquent account at the time of payment; 
"Second, against the penalty charged upon the 
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delinquent tax for the last year included in the 
delinquent account at the time of payment; 
"Third, against the delinquent tax for the last year 
included in the delinquent account at the time of 
payment; 
"Fourth ,against the interest accrued upon the de-
linquent tax for the next to last year included in 
the delinquent account at the time of payment; 
"And so on until the full amount of the delinquent 
tax, penalty and interest upon the unpaid balances 
shall have been paid within the period of redemp-
tion as aforesaid." (Emphasis ours.) 
Such redemption is made specifically to pay delinquent 
taxes and to absolve the property from the tax lien. No 
mention is made of paying any amount ''to redeem the land 
from the sale and reinvest the owner with legal title." 
Bowen v. Olson, supra. 
SUBDIVISION D. 
This is the crux of the whole situation. This Supreme 
Court has on numerous occasions held that the preliminary 
sale does not foreclose the lien for taxes, that the tax lien 
continues, that no title passes until the Auditor's Tax Deed 
is made to the county, or the Auditor's Certificate is affixed 
to the Preliminary Tax Sale record. The redemption is made 
to discharge the lien for taxes, and not to reinvest the owner 
with legal title. 
We think it clear from the statements in the opinion of 
Bowen v. Olson, supra, that this Supreme Court did not con-
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sider Aggelos v. Zelia Mining Company, supra, to be a para-
llel case in holding that "the purchase at a tax sale did not 
amount to the payment of taxes for such purpose." Al-
though Aggelos v. Zelia Mining Company, supra, quotes Ro-
bertson v. Bachmann, supra, we have shown that the latter 
case does not involve adverse possession, but a statute re-
quiring the payment of taxes only, and that the so-called 
"majority rule" does not apply to statutes involving adverse 
possession. 
In its opmwn in Bowen v. Olson, supra, this court 
eschewed the case of Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509, 261 P. 
450 because such case does "not involve any question of 
adverse possession." However, this case is the background 
for many adverse possession cases and other cases as well 
that redemption is the payment of delinquent taxes and not 
the redemption of title which has passed. We now proceed 
to quote some of these cases and cite many more. 
In Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d, 400, this 
Supreme Court made a ruling which has been repeatedly 
held both before and after, as the basis of the construction 
of our tax sale statutes. We quote profusely from this case 
for the reason that until the Bowen v. Olson, supra, case 
was decided , there was no departure from the princples laid 
down in the case under consideration. It is to be noted that 
this case was decided before the 1939 amendment abolishing 
the tax sale certificate, as are many more of the cases here-
inafter quoted. 
After quoting Section 80-10-59, U. C. A. 1943 above 
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quoted, the opinion reads on page 406 of the Pacific Re-
porter: 
"The county cannot be a redemptioner from itself 
nor for the other governmental units for which the 
county collects general taxes. Construing section 
6024, Comp. Laws 1917, in the case of Sorensen v. 
Bills, 70 Utah, 509, 261 P. 450, 451, the court said: 
'The owner of the property, within the period all-
owed for redemption, had redeemed the property 
from that tax sale, and thereafter any right that 
the county had by reason of the levy and the tax 
in the year 1917 was extinguished to the same ex-
tent that its claim would have been had the taxes 
been paid prior to the delinquent tax sale. * * *' 
"When the period of redemption has expired and 
the county has received a tax deed for any real 
estate sold for delinquent taxes, and county tax lien 
merges into the title as effectively as by execution 
sale with further rights of redemption as the stat-
ute provides. Purchasers from the county then 
take with a 'new and complete title in the land, 
under an independent grant from the soverign auth-
ority, which bar or extinguishes all prior titles and 
incumbrances of private persons, and all equities 
arising out of them.' " 
* * * * * 
"The purchaser from the county (not a redemp-
tioner) take title free and clear of liens, otherwise 
the county would be hampered in collection of tax-
es and prevented from again having the property 
returned to the assessment rolls." 
* * * * * 
"If he then permits the redemption period to expire 
and the title to become vested in the county or a 
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purchaser after the redemption period expired, his 
mortgage lien is extinguished, although the con-
tract and debt obligation between the mortgagor 
and mortgagee may still subsist." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
Continuing on at pages 420 and 421 of the Pacific Re-
porter: 
"When the period of redemption has passed and the 
auditor transfers the property to the county for the 
taxes, then the general tax lien is foreclosed and 
the lien disappears, because the county in whose 
favor the lien ran itself takes the title. The lien 
for general taxes disappears, and so do all inferior 
liens or rights to resort to the land for payment 
of debts." 
* * * * * 
"By section 6056, Comp. Laws 1917, the board of 
county commissioners 'may', at any time after the 
period of redemption has expired and before the 
so-called May sale, permit the redemption from any 
sale where the property has been sold to the county. 
By the 1933 Revision (80-10-68) the word 'may' 
was changed to 'shall' so as to require the county 
commissioners to grant redemption. This is a pri-
vilege given to save the taxpayer from the ultimate 
loss of his property as long as it is still within the 
possibility of the county to permit it, but does not 
change the theory that the liens are cleansed by 
the auditor's deed to the county. It makes the for-
mer owner preferred as a purchaser for the taxes 
and penalties." 
If this Supreme Court were construing the SECOND 
redemption period in the instant case and not the FIRST 
redemption period, then a different result might be obtained 
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and the ruling of the court in Bowen v. Olson, supra, be cor-
rect. But this opinion was handed down before the Tax 
Sale Certificate and the Auditor's Deed were abolished by 
the 1939 amendment. Surely after the 1939 amendment, no 
title could possibly pass until after the May sale and the 
Auditor's Certificate is affixed to the Preliminary Tax Sale 
Record. There was no second redemption period after the 
1939 amendment. 
Continuing quoting from Hanson v. Burris, supra, this 
Supreme Court said: 
"Under the amendments, Chapter 139, Laws of 
Utah 1921, lands could not be sold for a current 
delinquency to a private person, but had to be 
sold to the county, and certificate of sale going 
only to the county. The auditor's deed then went 
to the county and the county having title to the 
property sold from that point. Whatever the pro-
cess, the final deed from the auditor to the county, 
or, before the amendment of 1921, to the purchaser 
after four years from the first sale, cut off not only 
the inferior liens, but all the liens, and whatever 
the nature of the right or lien given by section 
2072, it was extinguished. As previously analyzed, 
it was a right to subject through the taxing mach-
inery each tract of land for the payment of its pro-
portion of the indebtedness. That right is gone." 
From the foregoing, the only conclusion that can be 
drawn is that the FIRST redemption from the prelimin-
ary tax sale, even when a certificate of sale was made to 
third parties, was a payment of taxes to discharge the pro-
perty from the tax lien, and no title having passed until the 
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auditor's tax deed issued (which is now abolished) the re-
demption was not made to redeem the tax payer's title. 
Therefore, the statement made by this Supreme Court, in 
Bowen v. Olson, supra, as follows: 
"A payment made after the land has been sold for 
taxes is not made to discharge a claim for taxes but 
to redeem the land from the sale and reinvest the 
owner with legal title." 
is in error and without merit or precedent in this state and 
is contrary to all decisions made under our tax sale pro-
cedure. 
Millard County v. Millard County Drainage Dist., 86 
Utah, 473, 46 P. (2d), 423 is a companion case to Hanson 
v. Burris, supra. 
In Bozievich v. Schlecta, supra, this Supreme Court 
said, at page 240 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"In Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, supra, this 
court held that a purchaser of a tax sale certificate 
did not hold the property adversely to the record 
owner because by the statute of this state the own-
er had a definite period of time within which to 
redeem and when the purchaser took possession of 
the property by virtue of a tax sale certificate it 
was 'in effect, an admission on his part that he 
held subject to the owner's right of redemption.' 
"It will be noted that possession in the above case 
was taken by virtue of a tax sale certificate. Such 
a certificate does not purport to convey title to the 
land. The purchaser of a tax sale certificate knows 
that the legal owner has a certain definite period 
within which he may redeem from the sale and 
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until such period has passed it is presumed that 
when such purchaser takes possession he takes it 
in subordination to the right of the owner and not 
adversely to him." (Emphasis added.) 
In Richards v. State Tax Commission, 92 Utah 503, 69 
P. (2d), 515 at page 516, this court said: 
"Appellant has confused a redemption of property 
from a tax sale to the county and a sale by the 
county after title has vested in the county and the 
right of redemption has gone." 
So has thjs Supreme Court confused the redemption of 
property from a tax sale to the county and a sale by the 
county after the title has vested in the county and the right 
of redemption has gone. Such confusion appears in the 
opinion in Bowen v. Olson in many places. 
See also Utah Lead Co. v. Piute County, 92 Utah 1, 65 
P. (2d) 1190. This case quotes Hanson v. Burris, supra. It 
is an adverse possession case. 
See also Western Beverage Co. of Provo, Utah, v. Han-
sen et ux., 98 Utah, 332, 96 P.(2d) 1105. This case turns 
on Hanson v. Burris, supra. 
Deseret Irr. Co., v. Bishop, 92 Utah, 220, 67 P. (2d), 
210, follows the case of Hanson v. Burris, supra, and states: 
"In the instant case, the plaintiff is in no position 
to complain as to whether or not a May sale was 
held. No attempt to redeem or to secure permiss-
ion to redeem or to exercise a right of redemption 
is either pleaded or proved. No suggestion is made 
that any tender has been made either to the county 
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or the purchaser from the county. Plaintiff is not 
in a position to complain having by stipulation 
agreed that the county had taken deed after the 
expiration of the four-year period, and thereby, 
if effect is to be given to the deed to the county, 
divested the owner of title." (Emphasis ours.) 
Morley Dean was never divested of title in the case 
now before this court even though he let his 1947 and 1948 
taxes go delinquent, because he redeemed the delinquent 
taxes before any deed or certificate was made to divest him 
of title. 
Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah, 485, 46 P. (2d), 428, states: 
"The stipulation speaks of the extinguishment of 
the said tax lien on May 22, 1928, and from this 
we would presume that the property had been re-
deemed and not purchased at a sale from the 
county. As a technical matter, the lien of the 
tax is extinguished by the auditor's tax deed to 
the county." (Quotes Hanson v. Burris, supra.) 
American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah, 
318, 117 P. (2d) 293, it is said, at page 297 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
''The court found that all tax proceedings up to 
and including the issuance of the tax deed were 
regular and valid. That deed, as stated in the 
prevailing opinion, vested the fee title in the county 
and the plaintiff thereafter had only a right of 
redemption until a valid May sale. Unless and un-
til that right of redemption was exercised plaintiff 
had no title to be quieted. The taxpayer's duty 
in such case therefore is to redeem from the sale, or 
to offer to redeem and make tender of the amount 
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necessary for a redemption. When he has redeem-
ed he has legal title which could support an action 
at law." 
The above statement refers to the SECOND redemption 
period, and not to the FIRST redemption period. Title does 
not pass until the Auditor's Tax Deed or, under the 1939 
amendment, until the Auditor's Certificate is affixed to the 
Preliminary Tax Sale record. If this court were talking 
about the SECOND redemption period, its conclusions might 
have been correct that redemption is not payment of taxes 
because the title has passed to the county, and the redemp-
tion is made to redeem the title. But in the instant case, 
we are talking about the FIRST redemption period. 
The distinction to be noted is whether or not the cer-
tificate of tax sale conveys title. Under the 1943 statute in 
force when the 1947 sale was made, the certificate of sale 
had been abolished. But even though it were still used, the 
governing rule is: Did the certificate of sale convey title? 
If it did, redemption is not the payment of taxes. If it did 
not, then redemption is the payment of taxes. This is mani-
fest in an Oklahoma case. Oklahoma has the same tax sale 
procedure as lllinois in the main, with the two year right 
of redemption, with the purchaser to obtain a deed after 
sixty days' notice to the former owner. This case is Ken-
worthy v. Murphy, 228 P.2d 382, which states: 
"A certificate of purchase issued on a tax sale does 
not constitute color of title. Harrell v. Enterprise 
Savings Bank, 183 Ill. 538, 56 N. E. 63; McKeighan 
v. Hopkins, 14 Neb. 361, 15 N. W. 711; Salt Lake 
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Investment Co. v. Fox, 32 Utah 301, 90 P. 564, 13 L. 
R. A., N. S., 627, 125 Am. St. Rep. 865. In the later 
case of Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 
239, 240, the Utah court in referring to the rule 
announced in Salt Lake Investment Co. v Fox, sup-
ra, said: 
"In Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, supra, this 
court held that a purchaser of a tax sale certificate 
did not hold the property adversely to the record 
owner because by the statute of this state the own-
er had a definite period of time within which to 
redeem and when the purchaser took possession 
of the property by virtue of a tax sale certificate 
it was "in effect, an admission on his part that he 
held subject to the owner's right of redemption." 
"'It will be noted that possession in the above case 
was taken by virtue of a tax sale certificate. Such 
a certificate does not purport to convey title to the 
land. The purchaser of a tax sale certificate knows 
that the legal owner has a certain definite period 
within which he may redeem from the sale and un-
til such period has passed it is presumed that when 
purchaser takes possession he takes it in subordin-
ation to the right of the owner and not adversely to 
him. * * * '" 
"But in Tennessee a tax certificate describing the 
boundaries of the premises is color, Winters v. 
Hainer, 107 Tenn. 337, 64 S. W. 44. And in Arkan-
sas it is held that a certificate of purchase is color, 
since the statute makes the sale, and not the deed, 
the investiture of title so far as adverse possession 
is concerned, Worthen v. Fletcher, 64 Ark. 662, 
42 s. w. 900." 
There was no title passed by the 1947 sale. The tax 
lien was not extinguished and when Morley Dean paid his 
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taxes on December 29th, 1949, and redeemed it from the 
lien, it was done by the paying of taxes. 
ERROR III. 
The court erred in holding that the mineral estate was 
subject to the general rule it made that redemption was not 
the payment of taxes, for the reason that no taxes were 
assessed against the mineral estate for the years 1947, 1948 
and 1949, and such mineral estate was never sold for taxes. 
Referring to Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, the abstract of title, 
it is to be observed at pages 41-42, that J. Parry Bowen, also 
known as J. Perry Bowen, also known as J.P. Bowen, and 
his wife, conveyed to J. A. Cheney an undivided one half 
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in 
and under and that may be produced from the lands involved 
in this action and other lands, by Mineral Deed acknowledg-
ed August 19th, 1946, and recorded August 21st, 1946, in 
Book "10" of Miscellaneous, pages 332-333 of the records of 
Uintah County, Utah. 
This deed constituted a severance of the surface and 
and mineral estate. 
Section 80-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, in effect 
when the 1947 taxes were assessed, reads as follows: 
"80-5-3. By State Tax Commission-Properties 
Assessed by, Enumerated * * * * * all mines and 
mining claims, and the value of metalliferous mines 
based on three times the annual net proceeds there-
of as provided in section 80-5-56, and all other 
mines and mining claims and other valuable depos-
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its, including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons, 
nonmetalliferous minerals underlying land the sur 
face of which is owned by a person other than the 
owner of such minerals, * * 'x' * o~:, must be assessed 
by the state tax commission as hereinafter pro-
vided." (Emphasis ours). 
The abstract of title, Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 59 and 
60, shows all assessments for taxes made against the land 
between 1940 and 1949. There is no assessment made 
against J. A. Cheney, or his successors in interest, or against 
J. Parry Bowen, for any interest in minerals, after the deed 
to Cheney in 1946. 
In Utah Copper Co., v. Chandler, et. al., 45 Utah, 85, 
142 Pac. 1119, this Supreme Court held: 
"To make good title by adverse possession, the de-
fendants were required to pay all taxes lawfully 
levied and assessed against the premises so claimed 
by them. If, however, no taxes were lawfully ass-
essed or levied against the premises so claimed and 
occupied by them, they could acquire title by ad-
verse possession without payment of taxes." 
This proposition is fully discussed at pages 9 to 15 of 
Appellants' Reply Brief filed in the original appeal. 
For the sake of argument, granting that the surface 
estate may not be obtained by the plaintiff, Morley Dean, 
because of his failure to pay the 1947 and 1948 taxes before 
they became delinquent, there is no basis for not quieting 
the title to the mineral estate in the various mineral owners, 
inasmuch as Morley Dean, as the constructive trustee of 
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the mineral owners, continued in possession up to the time 
of trial, and the title of the mineral owners had then ripened 
into adverse possession without tacking on the payment of 
the 1947 and 1948 taxes on the surface. 
ERROR IV. 
As to point ill in the original appellants' brief on file 
in this rna tter, we wish to stress that the rulings of this 
court support the argument given at pages 27 to 34 of the 
brief. These rulings are fully set forth in the former brief. 
In United States v. Wooten et al., 40 F. (2d), 882, the 
court said: 
"V. With reference to the particular claims: In 
some of the claims the evidence showed that for 
a particular year the taxes were not paid at all. 
The trial court held that the taxes were not "law-
fully assessed and levied" because of errors in the 
description. The New Mexico Supreme Court has 
just decided, in the case of Ferguson v. Gusdorf, 
290 P. 214, that descriptions in tax assessments 
must be 'sufficient, unaided, to identify the land.' 
That decision is under an early statute, but on the 
whole we conclude that the trial court correctly 
applied the New Mexico statutes. As to one claim, 
No. 76, the evidence shows that the taxes from 
1919 to 1924 had not been paid when the suit was 
filed. During the progress of the trial, a state 
court decreed that the assessment was unlawful, in 
that it was excessive, and the description indefinite. 
The question presented to the trial court in this 
case was whether, at the date of filing the petition, 
any taxes 'lawfully assessed' were unpaid. The 
trial court necessarily found this assessment un-
68 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lawful. The state court has also so decreed. The 
claim cannot be defeated therefore because of the 
nonpayment of unlawful assessments. The circum-
stances concerning the taxes on this property re-
flect upon the good faith of the claim of possession; 
but the trial court has found good faith; the finding 
is not attacked, and the evidence thereon not be-
fore us, and it cannot therefore be reviewed." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
It is significant to note, that the trial court in the case 
before the court, not only found that Morley Dean was act-
ing in good faith, but that it "tends to offend one's sense 
of justice" to decide against Dean and the other plaintiffs. 
Can this Supreme Court, in fairness, say to the plain-
tiffs "you have been in good faith in your possession, and 
have paid taxes for seven years under our previous rulings, 
it offends justice to decide against you, but we cannot allow 
you to show the invalidity of the eighth year's tax sale be-
cause the lower court denied your motions to show such in-
validity." 
But most assuredly the lower court and this Supreme 
Court cannot say that an assessment is made according to 
law, when the tax was paid by the adverser and the opposing 
party claims that the sale is a valid sale which divests the 
adverser of title (when it does not), unless the one who 
makes the claim of validity offers proof thereof. 
As to point IV, under subdivisions A and C thereof, 
pages 34 to 36, and pages 45 to 53 of the original Appellants' 
Brief, supported by Point IT of Appellants' Reply Brief, at 
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pages 5 to 9 thereof, the argument stated in the two previous 
briefs are sufficient, and should be given thorough consid-
eration on this rehearing. 
As to point V in the original brief, at pages 53 to 56 
of the said Appellants' Brief, is a comprehensive argument 
showing that Olson is guilty of laches. This subdivision 
and point should be given careful consideration by this Su-
preme Court. 
The writer has been involved in many cases in which 
the adverser has allowed his taxes to become delinquent 
and while in adverse possession in good faith, he has re-
deemed these from the preliminary tax sale. In most 
of such cases, the adverser has spent considerable time and 
money improving the land, has greatly added to its assessed 
value, has made a tax revenue considerably higher than it 
was before, and being a resident on the land or in its vicinity, 
has used it to its best advantage. In nearly all of the cases, 
the former record title owners were non-residents of the 
state, and most of them held the land for speculation. It 
could have lain in the sun without use and without taxation 
forever unless some oil boom or uranium boom came along 
which would allow their speculative instinct to be aroused. 
We do not think that any of these speculators should be 
allowed to come back to Utah after absences of many years, 
with the smell of oil in their nostrils, or the heat of uranium 
firing their desires, and reclaim their property because an 
70 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
adverse occupant in good faith has failed to pay one year's 
taxes on time. We think that the rule quoted concerning 
laches by the California court should be applied in this case 
and in many others where such speculators have failed to 
show any good faith and have failed for more than fifteen 
years to carry the tax burdens of the state and other taxing 
units. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellants most strongly urge that: 
1. This Supreme Court has already found that plain-
tiffs have seven years' adverse possession, and have paid 
seven years' taxes to support such possession. 
2. That there is no precedent in the United States (ex-
cept in Texas) to support the contention that under our ad-
verse possession statutes, redemption from our preliminary 
tax sale by one in actual adverse possession in good faith, 
is not the payment of taxes. 
3. That even though this court had not found that 
plaintiffs had complied with the adverse possession statute, 
plaintiffs should have been given judgment on the counter-
claim interposed by the defendant, Olson. 
4. That the mineral interest, not being assessed for 
the years 1947, 1948 and 1949, should without doubt under 
any consideration be quieted in the plaintiffs according to 
their respective interests. 
5. That in equity the plaintiffs should prevail and the 
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Lower Court's "sense of justice" should not be offended. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. STANLEY 
COLTON & HAMM:OND 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Cross-
Defendants and Appellants. 
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